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Recent work in cognitive and computational neuroscience depicts the brain as 
in some (perhaps merely approximate) sense implementing probabilistic 
inference. This suggests a puzzle. If the processing that enables perceptual 
experience involves representing or approximating probability distributions, 
why does experience itself appear univocal and determinate, apparently bearing 
no traces of those probabilistic roots? In this paper, I canvass a range of 
responses, including the denial of univocality and determinacy itself. I argue 
that there is reason to think that it is our conception of perception itself that is 
flawed. Once we see perception aright, as the slave of action, the puzzlement 
recedes. Perceptual determinacy reflects only the mundane fact that we are 
embodied, active, agents who must constantly engage the world they 
perceptually encounter.  
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1. Predictive Brains  
 
Brains like ours, according to some highly influential current theorizing in 
cognitive and computational neuroscience, are multi-level prediction machines 
– ‘predictive processors’ (Clark (2016)) that approximate Bayesian forms of 
inference as they deploy stored knowledge to negotiate a complex and 
uncertain world1. Bayesian inference is an optimal means of making use of new 
information in ways that are properly sensitive to uncertainty (for a nice 
introduction, see Wiese (2016)). Predictive processing approximates Bayesian 
methods by combining prior knowledge with incoming sensory evidence in 
ways that take account of uncertainty. Such systems are constantly trying to 
guess the incoming sensory barrage at many scales of space and time. To see a 
complex structured world of interacting objects is here to deploy a predictive 
model (a so-called  ‘generative model’) able to construct the incoming sensory 
signal for itself, using stored knowledge about the world.  
 
Momentary perceptual experience, if these stories are on track, always reflects a 
delicate combination of top-down model-based prediction, self estimated 
sensory uncertainty, and bottom-up (incoming) sensory evidence. When the 
top-down prediction is wrong, ‘prediction error’ signals result, and these are fed 
upwards (and sideways), allowing new ‘top-down’ guesses rapidly to be 
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recruited. It is only when all that settles, within current tolerances of noise, that 
a clear percept is formed. Given some sensory input (‘evidence’), such systems 
seek out the set of interacting worldly causes that make that evidence most 
likely. In essence, this is to attempt to guess the incoming sensory signal itself, 
given probabilistic knowledge about how the world is most likely to be. This 
process of ‘guessing the signal’ takes place at every level of neural processing, 
with each higher level constantly trying to guess the activity of the level 
immediately below (which it is thus treating as if it were a raw sensory signal).  
 
In pure Bayesian inference2, a system would not compute a single value, but 
rather deliver a conditional probability density function. Thus suppose the goal 
is to discover the depth of a visible object. Instead of computing a single value, 
such as ‘6 inches distant’, the conditional probability density function would 
encode “the relative probability that the object is at different depths Z, given 
the available sensory information” (Knill and Pouget 2004: 712). For example, 
it might suggest that the object is 6 inches distant with 70% probability, 7 
inches distant with 20% probability, and 5 inches distant with 10% probability.  
 
It is extremely unlikely, however, that real brains compute such functions. 
Instead, they must rely on approximations whose form has yet to be 
conclusively established. Possible approximations include ones that represent 
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only the mean and the variance of the distribution (it’s ‘sufficient statistics’ – 
see e.g Wiese (2016)). The lack of an agreed answer to the question of what 
approximations the brain actually uses – assuming it is indeed approximating 
Bayesian inference - has been dubbed (Wiese (2016)) the Probability 
Conundrum. However, even if our predictive processing brains are not 
explicitly representing probability values or densities, they are still combining 
prior knowledge with new evidence in ways that respect (by approximating) 
probabilistic Bayesian inference. The situation is nicely captured by John 
Kruschke (a leading Bayesian cognitive scientist) who, after describing standard 
approaches as associating descriptors with single determinate values, writes 
that: 
“Bayesian approaches assume a radically different mental ontology, in 
which the learner entertains an entire spectrum of hypothetical values 
for every descriptor. For example, the association between “shock” and 
“tone” might be anything on an infinite continuum, and the learner’s 
knowledge consists of a distribution of believabilities over that 
continuum. The learner may believe most strongly in a value of 0.413 
but also have some belief in values larger or smaller. Entertaining an 
infinite space of hypothetical values does not imply the need for an 
information processor of infinite capacity, for infinite belief distributions 
can be represented with small sets of values. For example, a normal 
distribution, which extends over an infinite space, is fully represented by 
its mean and variance.” Kruschke (2008) p.210-211 
 
This leads to a potential puzzle, as we shall next see. 
 
2. The Puzzle of Unitary-Coherent Perceptual Experience 
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In the process of perceiving the world we seem to experience, moment-by-
moment, a clear and univocal ‘way things are’, rather than what Lu et al (2016) 
colourfully describe as a ‘Bayesian blur’ of possibilities’ 3 . More precisely, 
experience seems to be ‘unitary-coherent’ (UC) where: 
Unitary means we only perceive one interpretation at a time (e.g. either a 
face or a vase in the Rubin Vase illusion) rather than a blur of multiple 
possible interpretations (never the face and vase together). Coherent 
means that we almost always perceive scenes comprised of parts which 
do not contradict one another (e.g we do not see part face and part vase). 
Lu et al (2016) p.259 
 
It might be thought that the use of certain approximations dissolves the puzzle4. 
But although the underlying representations might now be of (for example)  
simply the mean and variance of the distribution, they still capture – as 
Kruschke insists -  the broad shape of a probabilistically inflected space. Indeed, 
if they failed to do so, they would be unable even to approximate probabilistic 
Bayesian inference. So although there is room to ask what difference different 
approximations might make, the core puzzle (I argue) is more general, and 
arises for every story that might reasonably be counted as an approximation to 
probabilistic inference. Moreover, even though it is true that in predictive 
coding formulations beliefs over continuous states of affairs are assumed to be 
Gaussian and can therefore only have one peak, PP itself depicts a process of  
hierarchical Bayesian inference in which there can be multiple models, each 
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with their own peak. The core puzzle, carefully expressed, thus concerns why 
moment-to-moment experience is unitary-coherent and seems to bear no traces 
of all this multi-level probabilistic guessing?  
 
Notice that this is not even simply a question about why there is a single 
winning interpretation. For there could be a single winning interpretation yet 
some form of experience that still displays traces of the space of near-misses – 
faint images, perhaps, of nearby ways the world might have been. Such a 
possibility seems especially pertinent when we consider (section 4) cases of 
bistable perception. Moreover, it is widely held that it is the addition of a utility 
or cost function (a constraint on acceptable solutions) that forces the posterior 
density function to a single value5. In motor control, for example, jerkiness is a 
cost that is minimized by good, smooth, solutions, and avoiding undue 
jerkiness can be used to help select a single solution from the space of 
possibilities.  So even if perceptual inference involves somehow computing 
over multiple probabilities the perceptual ‘output’, once constrained by a cost 
function, need not reflect this fact.  
 
It is worth noting, however, that things look somewhat different from the 
perspective of the PP theorist. This is because PP (in the version defended by 
Friston, Hohwy, Clark, Seth, and others) eschews the appeal to cost and utility 
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functions entirely. The reasons for this are complex (for discussion, see Friston 
(2011), Friston et al (2012), Clark (2016), chapter 4). But in essence, the idea is 
to absorb such functions into the generative model itself – a model that then 
simply predicts that motor behaviors will minimize ‘costs’ such as jerkiness or 
rate of change of torque. This sidesteps the need for certain expensive 
computations (see Friston (2011) pp. 491-492).  Nonetheless, the effect of 
incorporating the right expectations (in this case, expectations of smooth 
reaching etc.) into the generative model is the same, since prior beliefs about 
the (e.g. non-jerky) shape of trajectories of motion can now determine unique 
results.  
 
The puzzle is thus not how PP-style probabilistic processing could yield 
determinate, unitary-coherent results in the case of general perception, but why 
it should do so. In bringing about smooth, world-engaging motion, the value of 
avoiding jerk (and so building jerk-minimizing predictions into the generative 
model) is clear. But why, when experiencing the world, is perceptual processing 
being forced to depict only a single determinate and unified way things are? 
Why not keep alive, in experience, weighted traces of all the possibilities that 
are supported by the sensory evidence? Surely not to do so is to suppress 
important information that might usefully inform reason and choice? 
 
	 8	
At this point it might be suggested that experience does, at least at times, bear 
such traces. I return to this issue in Section 3. For present, I assume it does not. 
The puzzle I want to foreground can now be properly expressed. It is this. Why, 
assuming that perceptual experience is rooted in computations that trade 
(explicitly or implicitly) in probabilities, and only the PP-apparatus of generative 
model-based prediction, does experience turn out to be unitary-coherent? Why, 
in other words, is the posterior probability distribution apparently forced to 
collapse to a determinate (unitary-coherent) ‘take’ on how things are? 
 
The same puzzle is informally expressed by Holton who notes that: 
 
“At the level of what we see, rather than that of what our unconscious 
visual systems are doing, we don't have a graded continuum of 
confidence in different hypotheses. Perceptions are all-or-nothing.” 
Holton 2016: 10 
 
These puzzles about perception have a possible parallel in the case of 
intentions. Thus Holton (op cit) suggests that here too “at the level of what 
subjects themselves do… the relevant state looks to be typically all-or-nothing: 
either I intend to do something or I don't.” The worry here is that predictive 
processing models treat intentions to act as high-level probabilistic predictions, some 
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of which win out over others so as to bring about actions6. But when I intend 
to pick up the coffee and drink it, it does not feel as if I predict the act (or 
anything else, really) with only, say, 80% probability. Here too, it looks as if the 
agentive experience has been forced into a kind of determinacy and univocality 
that the bedrock processing lacks. 
 
A basic puzzle has now emerged. If the computations underlying perception 
and action are probabilistic (either involving explicit representations of 
probabilities or handy approximations), why does human experience present a 
univocal (unitary-coherent) scene, and why do our intentions to act strike us as 
determinate and univocal rather than probabilistic? It can seem (Holton (2016), 
Klein (In Press)) as if the sub-personal story here is somehow failing to make 
sufficient contact with the so-called ‘personal-level’ (Dennett (1969)) facts – 
facts about how the world, including our own mental life, appears to us as a 
reasoning and thinking being 
 
3. Perception in Action 
 
A deflationary response would be to argue that experience and intentions are 
not so unitary, univocal, or determinate after all – that they do bear traces of 
their putatively probabilistic roots. In this vein, Morrison (2016) (2017) argues 
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that degrees of confidence are ‘assigned’ within perceptual experience itself. In 
other words, degrees of confidence are not merely the results of a doxastic or 
post-perceptual (e.g. meta-cognitive) exercise but are routinely given within 
perceptual experience.  
 
Even if this is the case, however, our core puzzle remains. For however such 
confidence may be manifest (assuming it is) in experience, it is surely not 
manifest as e.g. concurrent visual experience of other (nearby) ways the current 
scene might be.  A scene may look fuzzy or unclear, and I may have more or 
less confidence in who or what it is that I am seeing. But that fuzziness and 
lack of confidence is itself given via or within a single unitary-coherent percept. 
There is still, if you like, just one way the scene currently looks to me – a way 
that is unitary-coherent even on those occasions when the scene seems fuzzy or 
unclear.  
 
There are other kind of case we might consider too. It might be claimed that 
object distance (for example) doesn’t look determinate at all, because we may 
well be uncertain between multiple estimates of that distance. But while this 
may be true for estimations as expressed (say) in inches, that does not yet imply 
that the object itself visually appears to be at an uncertain depth. The 
uncertainty here may simply be about how to translate a determinate 
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impression of depth into a public measurement system. There may be other 
times, however, when we do feel a genuine sense of uncertainty about the 
nature of the experience or percept itself, and not just how to label or 
categorize it. For example, I may be unsure just how I feel about going on a 
trip, or whether or not I can detect some very faint pattern. These are 
interesting and revealing cases, and I return to them later on. 
 
Our perceptual worlds display unity and coherence, and depict a single way 
things are. The reason for this lies, I now want to suggest, in the transformative 
role of action itself. It is the need for perception constantly to mandate action 
and choice that requires the system to opt for a single ‘overall take’ on how the 
world is now most likely to be. Thus, in the mostly unlikely event of a genuine 
tie between two or more posterior  ‘takes’ on how things are, such a system 
would in effect have to toss a mental coin and go for one take rather than any 
other.  
 
At first sight, this seems like a pointless refusal to profit from good information. 
Suppose you must decide between several possible items to purchase, and you 
had made an exhaustive list of all the relevant criteria. If you then provided full 
information about each item and asked an artificial neural network to crunch 
the numbers, you would surely want to be informed of the fact that three items 
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(say) had tied for top position. If the network just tossed a coin between those 
three and suggested only one to you, you would be under-informed. Likewise if 
it ‘solved’ the choice puzzle using some simple but irrelevant heuristic like 
‘choose the one whose name has the least number of letters’.  
 
But consider what happens next. Now, armed with the information that the 
three items are tied for first place, you still have to decide what to do. In many 
biologically realistic situations, this will be a matter of great urgency. Given (by 
hypothesis) that the best you can is to toss a coin, you still have to opt for one 
action or another!  
 
Perhaps, then, evolution (or life-time learning) has simply arranged to by-pass 
that potentially time-wasting space for further reflection or choice, forcing the 
perceptually encountered scene to appear determinately one way rather than 
another7. In PP, this means that the generative model includes an ‘expectation’ 
that the visual scene will be unitary-coherent. Such an expectation may be 
realized in many different ways, and might itself be the result of early learning 
or innate pre-disposition. Brains thus constituted still rely on multi-level 
probabilistic calculations, but are constrained to select, moment-by-moment, a 
single best-fit unitary model poised for the control of action and choice. 
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4. An Illustration: Binocular Rivalry 
 
As an illustration, consider the case of ‘binocular rivalry’. Binocular rivalry 
experiments8 originated with Charles Wheatstone (1838), who invented the 
‘stereoscope’ – a device that used mirrors to present different images to each 
eye. In contemporary work, the same effect is usually achieved (see e.g. 
Leopold and Logothetis, 1999; Alais and Blake, 2005) using the kinds of 
anaglyph image viewing spectacles familiar from early 3D movies and comics. 
These have differently colored lenses for each eye (e.g. red one eye, cyan the 
other). This allows the presentation of two different images (one in each 
colour) at roughly the same on-screen location, while ensuring that each eye 
receives information about just one of the images. In the (non-rivalrous) case 
of 3D viewing, the two images are nearly identical, but reflect slightly different 
perspectives with offsets that create apparent differences in depth. Here, the 
brain is easily able to merge the two bodies of visual evidence in a way that 
yields the familiar experience of a single scene with objects at varying depths.  
 
Binocular rivalry occurs when the images presented to each eye depict different 
scenes altogether. A much-used preparation here is the house/face stimulus, 
many examples of which can be found online. Here, the anaglyph image 
combines the broad outline of a house rendered in one colour with that of a 
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face rendered in the other. Exposed to such a stimulus, subjects do not 
experience (as in the 3D case) a single scene with objects arranged at various 
depths.  Nor do they experience a stable superposition of (e.g.) house and face. 
Instead, they report an alternating pattern in which first one scene dominates 
awareness, and then the other, and then the first again. These face/house 
transitions are not always sharp, and may involve a gradual ‘breaking through’ 
of elements of the other image, before it dominates the previous one, after 
which the whole cycle repeats ((see e.g. Lee at al, 2005). But crucially, the 
subjective experience is one in which one coherent scene repeatedly gives way 
to another.  
 
This intriguing pattern within subjective experience falls neatly into place given 
the predictive processing framework and the considerations concerning action-
selection mentioned above. For as Hohwy et al (2008) point out, the brain here 
commands two perfectly good models (house/face) each of which is able to 
predict a large amount of the impinging sensory signal. But neither is able to 
predict the full signal, since that signal – thanks to the ecologically peculiar 
circumstances involving differently colored lenses and an anaglyph image – 
carries roughly equal amounts of information suggesting two normally quite 
incompatible real-world scenes. This delivers what they describe as an 
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‘epistemological’ rationale for the constant switching between house and face 
percepts.  
 
Thus suppose, for whatever reason, that the brain’s first attempt to recruit a 
hypothesis that minimizes prediction errors with respect to the visual inputs 
discovers that ‘house-at-location X’ is effective. This ‘best-guess’ 
accommodates a large amount of the present signal (everything delivered via 
one anaglyph channel). But now, prediction error remains for all the 
information arriving via the other channel. To accommodate this, a new 
hypothesis must emerge. Fortunately, there is a very good one readily available. 
For the ‘face-at-location-X’ hypothesis minimizes all the remaining prediction 
error. It now dominates, and the ‘face’ percept enters subjective experience. 
But now, prediction error accrues for all the information (previously nicely 
accommodated) entering via the other anaglyph channel. To minimize this, 
another new hypothesis must be found. Fortunately, there is one readily 
available – the ‘house’ hypothesis!  
 
But why, under such circumstances, do we not simply experience a combined 
or interwoven image: a kind of house/face mashup for example? Although 
such partially combined percepts do occur, and may persist for brief periods of 
time, they are never complete (bits of each stimulus are missing) or stable. Such 
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mash-ups do not constitute a viable hypothesis given our more general 
knowledge about the visual world. For it is part of that general knowledge that, 
for example, houses and faces do not occupy the same place, at the same scale, 
at the same time. This kind of general knowledge may itself be treated as a 
systemic prior, albeit one pitched at a relatively high degree of abstraction (such 
priors are sometimes referred to as “hyperpriors”). In the case at hand, what is 
thereby captured is the fact that “the prior probability of both a house and face 
being co-localized in time and space is extremely small” (Hohwy et al (2008) p. 
691). This, indeed, may be the deep explanation of the existence of competition 
between the higher-level hypotheses in the first place -  these hypotheses must 
compete because the system has learned that “only one object can exist in the 
same place at the same time” (Hohwy et al (2008) p. 691). The constant 
switching that characterizes our subjective experience in binocular rivalry cases 
is thus explained. The switching is the inevitable result of the probabilistic 
prediction error minimizing regime as constrained by the hyperprior that the 
world in which we live and act in is one in which unitariness and coherence are 
the default.  
 
5. Intentions, Predictions, and Imagination 
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What about the parallel puzzle concerning human intentions? Are these, as 
Holton (2016) suggests, also ‘all-or-nothing’ states, and if so, does that pose a 
harder puzzle for the predictive processing story?  
 
Holton’s suggestion is that an agent, when she intends to do X, intends just 
that: to do X. She does not intend to do X with 60% probability and Y (or just 
‘something else’) with 40% probability. Subjectively speaking, this case seems 
far less clear-cut. Some folk (myself included), may quite explicitly intend to do 
something with some associated probability. For example, I may say, if asked, 
that there is a 60% probability that I’ll come to a party. And while this may 
sometimes reflect uncertainties about other commitments, it may just as easily 
reflect uncertainties about my own future trajectories and desires. But for the 
sake of argument, let’s assume that very often, at least, our own intentions 
strike us as ‘all-or-nothing’. I say to myself  “I am going to the party” and I 
intend simply that - with whatever implied ‘ceteris paribus’ caveats common-
sense dictates. Is this kind of personal-level state consistent with its putative 
thoroughly probabilistic sub-personal underpinnings? 
 
I think it is. The key point to notice is that intentions and desires, as 
implemented within the predictive processing schema, involve predictions and 
imaginative explorations of our own future actions (Pezzulo et al. 2015). That 
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means that the very same pattern of constraints applies. I cannot actually just 
go 60% to the party, but must end up either going or not going. So my 
predictions of my own future actions and my imaginative explorations of their 
consequences, ought to be constrained by this (as by any other) real-world fact.  
 
The realm of mental exploration thus inherits the webs of constraint and 
possibility proper to their real-world counterparts. In order to make up my 
mind about the party, I must imaginatively explore possible futures that fall 
into two very definite camps – one camp features going to the party, and one 
does not. Once I have decided which (given any other constraints) appeals 
most, I will end up predicting that I will take one or the other path. The ‘all-or-
nothing’ nature of many human intentions and desires may thus follow directly 
from the all-or-nothing nature of human action itself. 
 
6. Experiencing Sensory Uncertainty 
 
A residual puzzle concerns the experience of perceptual uncertainty. For we do 
sometimes experience a lack of certainty about our own intentions, or about 
what is in the visual scene. Does the picture of visual experience (and 
perceptual experience more generally) as unitary-coherent render such 
experiences themselves problematic?  
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A full treatment of this issue is beyond the scope of this paper, but we may 
sketch the general shape of a response. Agentive choice and reason needs to be 
informed by just the right amount of ‘personal-level’, agent-accessible  
information – not too much, and not too little.  Thus consider the agentive 
experience of surprise at a certain sight or sound. This can seem puzzling, since 
to experience the sight or sound at all requires (if these stories are on track) the 
brain to deliver the percept that is least ‘surprising’ insofar as it best minimizes 
prediction error given the priors and the current waves of sensory evidence. 
Plausibly, however, the agentive experience of surprise marks something subtly 
different: the distance between systemic prior expectations and the least-
surprising posterior consequent upon receiving sensory evidence. In this way, 
the agent is simultaneously apprised both of the current overall (least 
surprising) best-guess about the world, and the fact that this best-guess 
represents a state of affairs that was previously considered improbable. It is 
plausible to suggest that the agentive experience of surprise tracks this prior 
improbability, delivering (potentially important) information concerning the 
large divergence between prior and posterior. 
 
Similarly, the experience of sensory uncertainty may function to maintain an 
agent’s awareness of her own (sub-personally computed) confidence in current 
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attempts to infer a course of action, or the contents of the distal scene9.  For 
example, she may be unsure if the shape seen in the field at dusk is a fox or a 
dog10. Notice (and see Morrison (2016) (2017), and Denison (2017) for further 
discussion) that this is unlike the case of binocular rivalry. In the case of 
viewing the shape in the field, we do not normally alternate between seeing a 
clear and distinct dog-image and seeing a clear and distinct fox-image. Rather, 
we experience a single, persisting, determinate shape (upon which we might act, 
by throwing a ball) which is actually quite well accounted for by either one of 
the two top-level hypotheses. That hard-to-categorize shape is itself the 
determinate, unitary, best-guess poised for the control of action and choice – 
even if the action is to move closer to get better information.  In binocular 
rivalry, by contrast, the system commands two equally good best-guesses, each 
resulting in a clear and distinct hypothesis, but each based on a different body 
of simultaneously-presented sensory evidence. 
 
It is worth noting that, given that a key role of the Bayesian processing is to 
drive action, many of those actions will themselves be epistemically motivated. 
They will be actions whose role is to gather information so as to reduce 
underlying uncertainty. Because PP stories (like all Bayesian accounts) 
‘inherently represent the degree of uncertainty’ (Kruschke (2008) p.211)  the 
probabilistic processing regime remains positioned to drive behaviors – such as 
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patterns of saccade around the scene- that seek to reduce uncertainty, more 
clearly favouring one take on the world over another. This means that the 
active being, though constantly presented with a unitary-coherent scene, is 
nonetheless constantly engaging that scene in ways that reflect the underlying 
swathe of probabilistic information. Agents like that get to have their cake and 
eat it – they encounter a unitary-coherent world as an arena for action and 
choice, while constantly checking that unitary-coherent take by exploiting, in 
action, the uncertainties that characterize the underlying Bayesian regime11. 
 
Finally, an interesting issue that here arises concerns the phenomenal character 
of peripheral vision12. It is sometimes suggested that peripheral visual content - 
unlike foveal experience -  is in some sense ‘statistical’ in character, or 
phenomenally indeterminate  (see e.g. Seth (2014) pp 113-114, Seth (2017, 
especially section 2.4), Cohen and Dennett (2011), Kouider et al (2010), Lettvin 
(1976), Madary (2013)). Such a picture potentially fits with the considerations 
concerning epistemic action, where the role of repeated foveations is to reduce 
high-level uncertainty by harvesting low-level information through repeated 
environmental probes13. In a multi-level, multi-area processing regime, support 
for such ‘mixed’ phenomenologies might be provided by the deployment of 
hierarchical generative models whose upper reaches trade in competing discrete 
state spaces while the lower ones track continuous variations in e.g. luminance, 
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speed, motion, contrast brightness etc. Peripheral vision is well-suited to the 
task of identifying useful cues using some of these features. Such an 
architecture amounts, however, to a bag of models that cannot itself have a 
single peak as there is no common metric space in which to compare them. 
Nonetheless, the higher levels (negotiating discrete state spaces) would be 
constrained to interact so as to deliver a unitary-coherent perceptual world fit 
for action and choice. Conflicting intuitions concerning the probabilistic or 
non-probabilistic nature of daily visual experience might then be explained by 
the operation of just such a heterogeneous hierarchical organization, combining 
continuous and discrete models in ways constrained to serve the ongoing 
selection of both practical and epistemic actions (for some preliminary 
discussion, see Friston et al (2017)). 
 
6. Conclusions: Bridging the Gap 
 
There is an apparent tension between the emerging picture of human brains as 
approximating probabilistic Bayesian inference and some mundane facts about 
experience itself. If much of the processing underlying experience trades 
(explicitly or implicitly) in probabilities, why is that character so often hidden 
from agentive sight? The answer, I have argued, is that perception is always and 
everywhere in the service of action, and that action (in a world like ours)  
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means choosing between competing but unitary-coherent ways the world might 
be. Agentive choice and action is thus best served by strongly predicting a  
unitary-coherent scene, while constantly probing, testing,  and revising our 
percepts in ways driven by self-estimated uncertainty. 
 
Does this mean that the probabilistic picture is of only limited use in explaining 
the personal-level facts? Quite the opposite seems to be true. For it is the deep 
probabilistic underpinnings of unitary-coherent human experience that explain 
otherwise puzzling phenomena arising within subjective experience itself, such 
as the alternating percepts experienced during binocular rivalry14, and that 
enables us to engage in constant epistemic actions whose role is to check and 
improve the unitary-coherent grip itself. 
 
 
* This paper was written thanks to support from ERC Advanced Grant 
XSPECT - DLV-692739. Special thanks to Anil Seth and Karl Friston, and to 
two anonymous referees whose careful critiques helped clarify the focus and 
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1  For reviews and introductions, see Clark 2013, 2016, Friston 2010, Hohwy 2013. 
 
2 Thanks to an anonymous referee for suggesting I clarify the difference that various ways of 
approximating Bayesian inference make to this picture, and to the puzzle I later target. 
 
3 ‘Bayesian’ because these systems combine prior knowledge with new evidence in ways that 
approximate Bayesian inference. 
 
4 Thanks to an anonymous referee for pursuing this issue. 
 
5 Thanks to an anonymous referee for stressing the importance of showing why this simple 
and popular move does not resolve the main worry.  
 
6 For proximal action control, this works roughly as follows. A predicted action is unpacked 
into a sequence of predicted proprioceptive states. Since these states are not actual, 
prediction errors emerge. Those errors are then quashed by bringing the action about. 
Proprioceptive predictions thus play the role of motor commands, and they act as a kind of 
‘self-fulfilling prophecy’ that entrains the action - see Shipp et al 2013, and for a non-
technical treatment, see Clark 2016: chapter 4. Longer-term control of action (for example, 
	 30	
																																																																																																																																																																					
by standing intentions) is treated in much the same way except that here, the entraining 
predictions concern patterns in the unfolding of events at a much coarser scale. A satisfying 
account of this challenging proposal is beyond the scope of this short treatment -see Pezzulo 
et al. 2015. 
 
7 Could we not perhaps preserve the puzzle by asking why we do not wait until an action is 
needed before enforcing a unitary-coherent take. This is a deep and interesting question. The 
answer, I suspect, is that action is not so much an occasional response to an input as an 
ongoing art of an integrated perception/action process  - a constantly rolling cycle in which 
perception and action are co-determined and co-determining  (see Churchland et al (1994)) 
with neither one waiting on the other to finish its work before making its own contributions. 
For more on how PP fits with this kind of vision, see Clark (2016) chapter 8 (Thanks to an 
anonymous reviewer for raising this issue). 
 
8 The phenomenon itself was noticed, in less controlled ways, by many others including 
Porta (1593) and Le Clerk (1712). 
 
9 This is reflected in the variable weighting of prediction error signals – see Clark 2016: 
chapter 2. 
 
10 Similarly, someone may feel unsure about whether or not they intend to go to the party, 
where that uncertainty reflects systemic lack of confidence in the inference whose 
conclusion is to go, and in the opposing inference too.  
 
11 For a compelling picture of the way Bayesian approaches drive behaviors that actively 
interrogate the environment so as to reduce uncertainty, see Kruschke (2008), and for the PP 
spin on that story, see Friston et al (2015). 	
12 Thanks to Anil Seth for discussion of this issue, and to Karl Friston  for pointing me to 
the work on continuous and discrete state spaces. 	
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13 See also Michael et al (2014), who show priming effects that reflect rapid perceptual 
estimations of variance itself, providing contextual clues that inform ongoing perception. 	
14 For many further examples of the power of the probabilistic story to illuminate personal-
level experience, see e.g. Hohwy 2013, Clark 2013, 2016, Seth 2013, Lupyan 2015. Our 
personal-level unitary-coherent percepts, as large bodies of work in psychophysics (see Knill 
and Pouget 2004) further attest, are themselves best explained by a picture of the brain as a 
near-optimal Bayesian integrator of multiple streams of probabilistic sensory information. 
